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U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Credibility
Maximization and Global Influence
Kristina Ash*
¶1

¶2

¶3

Post-September 11, 2001, the United States found itself in a predicament: even
though it possessed exceptional global power, the terrorist attacks exposed an
extraordinary security vulnerability. 1 In response, the Bush administration instituted
“sweeping strategies of domestic security, law enforcement, immigration control, security
detention, governmental secrecy. . .[and] forced disarmament of any country that poses a
gathering threat.”2 These policies have restricted individual rights in the United States, 3
and have created international hostility towards Western nations. 4
Often, if the United States does not involve itself in issues concerning human
rights, “nothing happens, or worse yet, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, disasters occur.”5
Thus, it is important that the U.S. have a voice in global leadership so that it may prevent
these human rights atrocities. The tragedy of current U.S. foreign policy is that by
excepting itself from international standards and policies, the US undermines the its role
in global leadership and activism, and allows grave human rights violations to
proliferate. 6
The United States must reevaluate its foreign policy. A starting point is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 7 The ICCPR is an early
United Nations treaty which “guarantees a broad spectrum of civil and political rights.”8
*

Kristina Ash, 2005 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; 1998 B.A., Cum Laude,
Arizona State University. I would like to thank my mother for her distinctive viewpoints and Joshua
Romero , my editor, for his patience, invaluable comments, and advice.
1
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN .L.REV 1479, 1497(2003).
2
Id.
3
See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S.
Immigration Policy: Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of
Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. A NN. SURV. A M. L. 295, 295-96 (2002)(stating that “[s]upporters and critics
alike saw the federal government as ‘pushing the envelope’ in restricting civil liberties in the name of
national security”).
4
See e.g. Sark Starr & Nicki Gostin, Anti-Americanism: Will We Be Booed?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 2004,
at 14 (discussing the “I’m afraid of Americans” t-shirts worn at Fashion Week in New York, the protests
over the American anthem during the Athens Games, and the “hatred of America…so endemic everywhere
in Europe”).
5
Koh, supra note 1, at 1488 (citing Richard C. Holbrooke, To End A War (1998); Samantha Power, A
Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (2002)).
6
Id. at 1487 (naming its “exceptional global leadership and activism” as “the most important respect in
which the United States has been genuinely exceptional”).
7
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976). The United States ratified the treaty Sept. 8, 1992 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 1 (102d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M . 645 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Comm.
Report].
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In 1992, the United States ratified the ICCPR, twenty-six years after it was unanimously
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and fifteen years after President Carter
signed the covenant. 9 With its ratification, the United States attached “an unprecedented
number” 10 of reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”), specifically five
reservations, five understandings, four declarations, and one proviso.
When it was considering the ratification of the ICCPR, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations articulated two goals. First, it sought to underscore its commitment to
the protection of human rights. Criticizing other countries’ human rights violations while
refusing to sign the international treaty has made the United States appear hypocritical in
the view of other states. 11 Second, ratification of the treaty would allow the United States
to participate in the Human Rights Committee, a committee established in the ICCPR to
“monitor compliance.” 12 This would allow the United States to actively participate in the
development and enforcement of human rights around the world.
This article proceeds in three parts: Part I provides a framework with which to
evaluate the U.S. reservations to the ICCPR. Part II analyzes the reservations taken by
the U.S. to determine whether its goals in ratification are adequately served. Part III
offers solutions to maximize U.S. influence on international human rights.
I. BACKGROUND

¶6

The ICCPR has nearly unanimous support around the world, signaling the
universality of its provisions. 13 Even so, many countries have elected to make certain
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”). None of the countries have
made more RUDs than the United States. This section provides the background
necessary to examine U.S. participation in the ICCPR, including the ICCPR history, its
major provisions, and the U.S. RUDs to the convention.
A. History

¶7

When the Allied forces discovered the human rights atrocities committed during
World War II, they were appalled. Shortly after the United Nations was formed, member
states moved to create a Universal Bill of Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. 14 Given its instrumental role

9

Id. at 2 (President Carter signed the ICCPR Oct. 5, 1977).
William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is
the United States Still a Party? 21 BROOKLYN J. INT ’L L. 277, 280 (1995).
11
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 3. (“In view of the leading role that the United States plays in the
international struggle for human rights, the absence of U.S. ratification of the covenant is conspicuous and,
in the view of many, hypocritical”).
12
Id. (“Ratification will enable the United States to participate in the work of the Human Rights Committee
established by the Covenant to monitor compliance”).
13
See Schabas, supra note 10, at 277 (stating that 114 states signed the ICCPR before the U.S. became a
party).
14
Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to the United States Ratification of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993. 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1209, 1211 (1993).
10
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in creating this Universal Bill of Rights, it is no surprise that the three covenants are
primarily consistent with the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. 15
¶8
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the ICCPR. 16 Less than ten years later, the covenant was entered into force;17
however, the United States was conspicuously missing from the group of countries which
had ratified the covenant.
¶9
Congress was considering ratification of the treaties in the 1950s. During that time,
state-sponsored segregation was prevalent in the United States. 18 Senator Bricker was
concerned because ratification of the treaties would invalidate thousands of laws which
discriminated against minorities. 19 He proposed a constitutional amendment that would
severely limit the treaty power given in the Constitution, making all international
agreements non-executing. 20
¶10
While the Bricker amendment did not pass, its shadow still looms over U.S. foreign
policy. The United States did not become party to any international human rights treaties
until 1988 when it ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. 21 Moreover, as Professor Taifa notes, the “current U.S. approach of
attaching non-self-executing declarations to such covenants and conventions [effectively]
accomplishes the original goal sought by Senator Bricker and others - to render
international human rights treaties impotent in U.S. law.”22
¶11
In 1977, President Carter signed the ICCPR, but according to the Senate
Committee Report, “domestic and international events at the end of 1979. . . prevented
the Committee from moving to a vote on the Covenant.”23 In 1991, President H.W. Bush
urged the Senate to renew its consideration of the ICCPR. 24 In 1992, after attaching a
number of RUDs which rendered the treaty powerless under domestic law, the United
States Senate finally voted to ratify the ICCPR, twenty-six years after it was unanimously
adopted by the U.N.

15

Id .(noting that the bills of rights share “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion
and expression; the right of peaceful assembly; the right to vote; equal protection of the law; the right to
liberty and security of the person, including protection against arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to a
fair trial, including the presumption of innocence; the right of privacy; freedom of movement, residence,
and emigration; freedom from slavery and forced labor; and the general right to protection of life, including
protection against the arbitrary deprivation of life”)
16
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 2.
17
Id. (entered into force March 23, 1976).
18
Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to Eliminate
All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 HOW . L.J. 641, 651 (1997).
19
Id. at 652.
20
Id.
21
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 23, 1989), G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); See David P. Stewart, The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1993).
22
Nkechi Taifa, supra note 9, 40 HOW . L.J. at 652.
23
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 2.
24
Id.
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B. Major Provisions in the ICCPR
¶12

The rights protected in the ICCPR are rights “rooted in basic democratic values and
freedoms.”25 The Covenant seeks to promote “the inherent dignity and . . . equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family [as] the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world.”26 To further this goal, the Covenant proffers twentyseven articles which give individuals around the world various civil and political rights
“without regard to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”27
¶13
Among the enumerated rights are self-determination, 28 right to life, 29 right to liberty
and security of person, 30 right to compensation for unlawful detention, 31 freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, 32 freedom of opinion, 33 right to peacefully assemble, 34
right to freedom of association, 35 rights of the family, 36 right to participate in the public
process 37 , and equal protection under the law. 38
¶14
The Covenant also prohibits governments from numerous activities including
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 39 slavery or other
compulsory labor, 40 propaganda for war, 41 and advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred. 42
¶15
In addition, the covenant establishes a Human Rights Committee to oversee
compliance of the various articles by the Parties to the covenant. Countries may
recognize the committee’s competence to consider complaints made by other parties to
the treaty. 43
C. United States Reservations to the ICCPR
¶16

Even though U.S. Congressmen “recognize[d] the importance of adhering to
internationally recognized standards of human rights,”44 they nonetheless excepted the
United States from several provisions in the treaty by making an unprecedented number
of RUDs.
25

Id. at 1.
ICCPR, supra note 7, at Prmbl.
27
Id. at Art. 2(1).
28
Id. at Art. 1.
29
Id. at Art. 6.
30
Id. at Art. 9-11.
31
Id.
32
Id. at Art. 18.
33
Id. at Art. 19.
34
Id. at Art. 21.
35
Id. at Art. 22.
36
Id. at Art. 23-24.
37
Id. at Art. 25.
38
Id. at Art. 26.
39
Id. at Art. 7.
40
Id. at Art. 8.
41
Id. at Art. 20.
42
Id.
43
Id. at Art. 41.
44
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 5.
26
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¶17

The U.S. made reservations to the ICCPR’s provisions on prohibition of war
propaganda, 45 capital punishment, 46 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 47 criminal
penalties, 48 and juveniles. 49 It made understandings concerning the provisions on equal
protection, 50 compensation for illegal arrests, 51 separate treatment of the accused from the
convicted, 52 and right to counsel, 53 and the extension of the provisions in the treaty to
federal states. 54 Finally, it made declarations with regard to the treaty being non-selfexecuting, 55 the rights that may be taken away during emergencies, 56 the Human Rights
Committee, 57 and the savings clause on natural wealth and resources. 58
¶18
Eleven countries made objections to the U.S. reservations, understandings, and
declarations included in its ratification. 59 It is important to note that while each of these
countries objected to certain provisions, none of the countries objected to the majority of
the U.S. reservations. 60
¶19
All eleven countries objected to the second U.S. reservation to Article 6 of the
ICCPR. Section 2 of Article 6 requires that the “sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes.”61 Section 5 states that the death penalty “shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be
carried out on pregnant women.”62 The United States reservation states:
[t]hat the United States reserves the right. . . to impose capital punishment
on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment,
45

Id. at 7. (making a reservation to the prohibition of “propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial,
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence” in Art. 20 of the
ICCPR).
46
Id. (making a reservation to the limitation concerning the “circumstances in which capital punishment is
imposed “ in article 6 of the ICCPR).
47
Id. at 8 (limiting the definition of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” in article 7 of
the ICCPR).
48
Id. (making a reservation to article 15 of the ICCPR).
49
Id. (making a reservation to article 10 of the ICCPR).
50
Id. at 9 (understanding that legal distinctions made in U.S. law are not inconsistent with article 26 or
article 2).
51
Id. at 16-17 (understanding that the right to seek compensation satisfies the provision’s right to
compensation in article 9(b) and article 14(6)).
52
Id. at 17-18 (understanding that consideration of the person’s dangerousness and allows the accused to
waive his right is allowed under the“exceptional circumstances” in article 10.
53
Id. at 18-19 (understanding that the right to counsel only attaches in criminal cases and does not afford
the defendant the right to choose his counsel).
54
Id. at 19-20 (understanding that given the federal system of government, the federal government will
implement the treaty to the extent that it is able and remove any impediments to states to fulfill their
obligations under the treaty.)
55
Id. at 20 (declaring that the treaty does not create a private cause of action in the U.S.).
56
Id. at 20-21 (declaring that even in times of emergency, the U.S. will adhere to its Constitution).
57
Id. at 21-22 (declaring that it is the intention of the U.S. to accept the competence of the Human Rights
Committee).
58
Id. at 22 (declaring that the right in article 47 must comport with international law).
59
The objecting countries were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
60
ICCPR, Objections, United Nations Treaties Collections (Feb. 5, 2002) available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm [hereinafter ICCPR Objections].
61
ICCPR, supra note 7, at Art. 6 § 2.
62
Id., Art 6 § 5.
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including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below the age
of eighteen years of age. 63
¶20

Countries objected to the U.S. reservation because it allegedly went against the
object and purpose of the treaty. Article 4 of the ICCPR allows for derogation from the
covenant during times of national emergency. 64 However, Article 4 Section 2 prohibits
States from derogating from essential articles in the Covenant. 65 These articles include
the right to life,66 the right to be free of torture 67 and slavery68 , right to be free of
imprisonment for breach of contractual obligations 69 , right to be free of ex post facto
laws, 70 right to be recognized as a person before the law, 71 and freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. 72 Arguably, the most essential of these articles is the right to
life. By reserving the right to sentence persons under the age of eighteen to death, the
United States contravened a major object and purpose of the treaty.
¶21
Nine of the eleven countries also objected to the third U.S. reservation regarding
article 7 of the ICCPR. 73 Article 7 states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”74 The U.S.
reservation states that Article 7 will only apply “to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.”75
¶22
States objected to this reservation on a variety of grounds. First, some objected for
the same reason that they objected to the reservation to article 6, namely that the
reservation is an essential article in the covenant and thus contravenes the object and
purpose of the treaty. 76 Like the previous reservation to the right to life, the right to be
free of torture is an essential civil and political right that cannot be modified even in
times of national emergency. Second, States objected on the basis that a country cannot

63

ICCPR, Declarations and Reservations, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu/b/treaty5_asp.htm
(February 5, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR Reservations].
64
ICCPR, supra note 7, Art. 4 §1 (“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin”).
65
Id. at Art 4 §2. (“No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made
under this provision”).
66
Id. at Art. 6.
67
Id. at Art 7.
68
Id. at Art 8.
69
Id. at Art 11.
70
Id. at Art 15.
71
Id. at Art 16.
72
Id. at Art 18.
73
The nine countries are Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden.
74
Id. at Art 7.
75
ICCPR Reservations, supra note 63.
76
Id. (Denmark, Norway, and Spain gave this reason for their objection.
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site domestic law as a reason not to fulfill its obligations under a treaty. 77 Third, a couple
of States interpreted the U.S. reservation “as a reference to article 2 of the Covenant, thus
not in any way affecting the obligations of the United States.”78
¶23
Finland and Sweden also objected to the U.S’. first understanding to the ICCPR,
considering it to be a reservation in substance. That understanding is as follows:
That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all persons
equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections against
discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth, or any other status – as those terms are used
in article 2, paragraph 1 and article 26 – to be permitted when such
distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective. The United States further understands the prohibition in
paragraph 1 of article 4 upon discrimination in time of public emergency,
based ‘solely’ on the status of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin, not to bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate
effect upon persons of a particular status. 79
¶24

Like the third reservation, this “understanding” relies on domestic law to alter the
U.S’. responsibilities under the ICCPR. Moreover, the “rational basis” standard carries
an extremely low burden for the state, so it likely does not meet the standard defined by
the ICCPR.
¶25
In order to analyze the various RUDs, the U.S. must consider these objections as
well as the implications of all RUDs. To do this, the U.S. should categorize each of the
RUDs, and decide whether they are necessary in light of U.S. goals in signing the
ICCPR.
II. ANALYSIS
¶26

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued in 1992 a report on the ICCPR,
urging Congress to ratify the treaty and naming two goals: (1) to “remove doubts about
the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to human rights”; and (2) to “strengthen the
impact of U.S. efforts in the human rights field.”80 However, in the same report, the
committee recommended a substantial number of RUDs. 81 While U.S. RUDs in and of
themselves do not necessarily undermine the first goal expressed by the committee, the
excessive number of RUDs submitted by the U.S. could easily raise doubts as to U.S.
commitment to the international human rights standards embodied in the ICCPR. Indeed,
eleven countries issued objections, mainly on the grounds that the RUDs went against the

77

Finland and Portugal.
ICCPR Objections, Objections taken by Germany. See also Objections taken by Italy.
79
ICCPR Reservations, supra note 63.
80
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 3.
81
Id. at 7-11 (suggesting five ICCPR Reservations, five understandings, and four declarations).
78
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object and purpose of the treaty. 82 In objecting to the U.S. reservation to article seven,
Portugal explicitly stated its skepticism of U.S. commitment to the covenant. 83
¶27
This is not to say that all reservations are intolerable. 84 In fact, of the considerable
quantity of RUDs taken by the United States, countries only made objections to three of
the U.S. reservations and one of the understandings. 85 Therefore, in order to achieve the
goals set forth in the Senate Committee Report, it is not necessary for the U.S. to
eliminate all of its RUDs. Instead, the U.S. need merely reexamine its RUDs and
determine whether they undermine U.S. goals.
¶28
In his article on American exceptionalism, Professor Koh described the world’s
perception of the United States as “pushy, preachy, insensitive, self-righteous, and
usually, anti-French.”86 Professor Koh attributes this image to four types of American
exceptionalism: distinctive rights, different labels, the "flying buttress" mentality, and
double standards. 87 Under this theory, it is the double standards that are the most
dangerous and destructive to Americans. 88 By using this system of categorization, one
can evaluate U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR and determine which of those RUDs the U.S.
should withdraw.
A. Distinctive Rights
¶29

Distinctive rights refer to those rights that have become more celebrated and
protected as a result of American policies and values which developed through America’s
unique culture and history. 89 Examples of these rights are nondiscrimination based on
race or protections of speech and religion. 90 RUDs falling into this category should not
give cause for concern because even under European Union law, these differences
between nations are allowed. 91
¶30
The United States made a reservation to Article 20 of the treaty, 92 which bans
propaganda for war as well as “national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
82

See ICCPR Reservations, supra note 63; ICCPR Objections, supra note 60 (the eleven countries were
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden).
83
Id., at Portugal (October 5, 1993)(“The Government of Portugal also considers that the reservation with
regard to article 7 in which a State limits its responsibilities under the Covenant by invoking general
principles of National Law may create doubts on the commitments of the Reserving State to the object and
purpose of the Covenant.” (emphasis added)).
84
Koh, supra note 1, at 1484 (“not all the ways in which the United States exempts itself from global treaty
obligations are equally problematic”).
85
ICCPR Objections, supra note 60 (Eleven States objected to the second U.S. reservation; nine objected to
the third reservation; one objected to the fourth reservation, and two objected to the first understanding).
86
Koh, supra note 2, at 1480.
87
Id. at 1483.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. (citing that “the U.S. First Amendment is far more protective than other countries’ laws of hate
speech, libel, commercial speech, and publication of national security information” (citations omitted)).
91
Id. (“judicial doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation,’ familiar in European Union law, permits sufficient
national variance as to promote tolerance of some measure of this kind of rights distinctiveness”); See also
Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT 'L L. &
POL. 843, 843 (“each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts between
individual rights and national interests or among different moral convictions”).
92
138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (1992).
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incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”93 Concerned that this provision would
violate freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, the Senate adopted a
reservation “[t]hat Article 20 does not . . . restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”94 Where U.S. duties under a
treaty conflict with rights protected in the U.S. Constitution, rights in the Constitution
must prevail. 95 This provision protects a distinctive right (free speech) and has been
given more protection in the United States than in some other countries. 96
¶31
In accordance with Koh’s theory, making a reservation to Article 20 did not detract
from the United States’ commitment to promoting human rights standards. First, Article
20 features two competing rights, both of which are represented in the treaty. Even
though the human rights commission did not believe that the two rights need necessarily
conflict, by clarifying its commitments under the ICCPR, the U.S. was able to protect its
sovereignty without risking violating the article and thus undermining its commitments to
human rights standards. 97 Second, many established democracies took exceptions to this
article, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, 98 so the U.S. is not contravening an internationally established
practice.
¶32
The United States also made a declaration regarding Article 19 of the treaty. 99
Article 19 protects freedom of expression subject to certain restrictions regarding
“respect of the rights or reputations of others [and] the protection of national security or
of public order . . . public health or morals.”100 The declaration states that the United
States would “whenever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or limitations on
the exercise of the rights recognized and protected by the Covenant, even when such
restrictions are permissible under the Covenant.”101 For this reason, the U.S. declared
that it would continue to grant the more expansive protection of free speech under the
U.S. Constitution. 102 This is essentially protecting the same distinctive right as the
reservation regarding free speech.
¶33
A second U.S. reservation tha t falls under this category is the reservation to the
ICCPR provision which holds that “[i]f, subsequent to the commission of the [criminal]
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender
93

ICCPR, supra note 7, Art. 20.
138 CONG. REC. at S4783.
95
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957)(stating “[i]t would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of
those who created the Constitution. . . to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions”).
96
See e.g. Thomas Lundmark, Free Speech Meets Free Enterprise in the United States and Germany, 11
IND. INT 'L & COMP . L. REV. 289, 300 (2001) (comparing the more expansive protection of speech in the
United States to Germany’s test which balances “the rights of the speaker…against those of the person
being injured by his speech”); Tammy Joe Evans, Comment, Fair Trial vs. Free Speech: Canadian
Publication Bans versus the United States Media, 2 SW . J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 203, 203 (1995) (stating that
publication bans frequently used in Canada to ensure a fair trial would be unconstitutional in the United
States).
97
ICCPR, supra note 7, gen. cmt. 11, 19th Session, July 7, 1983, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+11.En?OpenDocument.
98
ICCPR Reservations, supra note 63.
99
Senate Comm. Report, supra note 8, at 20-21.
100
ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(3).
101
Senate Report, supra note 8, at 20-21.
102
Id.
94
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shall benefit thereby.”103 Given that one of the goals of the criminal justice system is to
deter crimes, the Senate believed that the sentence that was in place at the time the
offense was committed should be imposed. 104 No objections were raised to this
reservation. 105 Moreover, Germany also made a similar reservation. 106
B. Different Labels
¶34

Different labels refers to “America’s tendency to use different labels to describe
synonymous concepts.”107 “Refusing to accept the internationally accepted human rights
standard as the American legal term . . . reflects a quirky, nonintegrationist feature of our
cultural distinctiveness.”108 RUDs falling under the “different labels” category include
the U.S. reservation regarding torture and the U.S. understandings regarding
compensation for unlawful arrests and the right to counsel.
¶35
The reservation regarding torture states that the U.S. only “considers itself bound
by Article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’
means “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohib ited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or
Fourteenth Amendment.”109 Essentially, this reservation uses a different label for the
same prohibited treatment. What is troubling about this reservation is that it allows some
internationally questioned government practices, such as execution by asphyxiation in the
gas chamber. 110 However, because the ICCPR does not ban the death penalty and
because European Courts have indicated their willingness to expand the meaning of
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ” to include the death penalty, it is
understandable that the U.S. would make this reservation to protect itself from the
evolving definition and allow changes to come about through legislation. 111
¶36
Articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the ICCPR provide for compensating victims of unlawful
arrest or detention. 112 The U.S. Senate Committee expressed concern that “it [was]
possible that in some . . . situations a victim of unlawful arrest or detention might not in
fact be able to recover compensation, notwithstanding the variety of compensatory
schemes which have been adopted.”113 The United States offered its citizens the same
rights sought to be protected in the ICCPR, thus they were generally in compliance with
the provision.
¶37
The U.S. also made an understanding regarding the right to counsel, because
although the U.S. government did guaranteed its citizens the right to counsel, this right
did not “entitle a defendant to counsel of his own choice when he [was] either indigent or
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financially able to retain counsel in some other form.”114 Additionally, criminal
defendants couldn’t compel unnecessary witnesses to his defense. 115 These rights are
protected in the United States, however, concern over American legal definitions
compelled the Senate Committee to include clarifications of the definitions in the form of
understandings.
C. The “Flying Buttress” Mentality
¶38

The “flying buttress” mentality refers to the American policy of supporting rights,
but not officially subjecting itself to the international standard, similar to the architectural
devise which upholds a structure from the outside. 116 The purpose is to comply while
still seeming to maintain uninhibited sovereignty. 117 Unfortunately, the practical result of
this policy is that the United States is alone with rogue states that do not officially support
the various human rights. RUDs which exemplify a “flying buttress” mentality are the
reservation regarding the treatment of juveniles and the understanding regarding the
separate treatment of the accused.
¶39
The U.S. made a reserva tion to Articles 10(2)(b) and (3) regarding the treatment of
juveniles. 118 The reservation acknowledged that “[t]he policy and practice of the United
States are generally in compliance with and supportive of the Covenant’s provisions
regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system.”119 However, the U.S.
insisted upon a reservation which would allow it freedom during exceptional
circumstances and where the juvenile has volunteered in the military prior to his or her
eighteenth birthday. 120 Essentially, this reservation wholly supports the right protected in
the covenant while still purporting to maintain freedom to deviate from that standard.
Similarly, the U.S. understanding regarding separate treatment of the accused basically
adheres to the standard set forth in the covenant while allowing deviation in “exceptional
circumstances.”121
¶40
While this “flying buttress” mentality is not necessarily problematic, it is
unnecessary. If the circumstances under which the U.S. deviates from the provisions in
the ICCPR are truly exceptional, the U.S. should be able and willing to defend its
departure. Therefore, these RUDs are unnecessary and give the appearance of
diminishing U.S. commitment to the ICCPR.
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D. Double Standards
¶41

¶42

¶43

¶44

¶45

While the other forms of American exceptionalism are caused by American culture
and differences in terms, this policy of double standards actually applies different rules to
Americans as to the rest of the world. 122 This creates problems because by excepting
itself from international norms, the U.S. is often accompanied by notorious human rights
violators such as Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. 123 The American practice also “sharply
weakens America's claim to lead globally through moral authority” which erodes at the
U.S'. “soft power.”124 Finally, because of the U.S’. unique position of power, excepting
itself to international rules actually weakens the rules, which prevent the U.S. from using
them against other countries in the future. 125
Examples of RUDs which exemplify these double standards are the reservation
regarding capital punishment of juveniles, the reservation regarding torture and
punishment, and the understanding regarding non-discrimination. It is these provisions
which the U.S. must remove in order to comport with the internationa l standards and
achieve its goal of removing doubts about the U.S. commitment to human rights.
First, the U.S. reserved the right “to impose capital punishment . . . for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”126 The U.S. goal of promoting
human rights standards is seriously undermined with this reservation. Since 2000, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iran, Pakistan, and the United States are the only
countries known to have executed juveniles. 127 Moreover, the majority of U.S. states do
not allow the execution of minors. 128
Article 4 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made.”129 If states may not derogate from this
provision even in times of national emergency, it follows that those provisions are central
to the object and purpose of the treaty. By making a reservation to Article 6, the United
States’ credibility is severely undermined, thus thwarting its primary goal in signing the
treaty.
Second, the U.S. stated that it understood that distinctions based on “race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or any other status…to be permitted [when] such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally
related to a legitimate government objective.”130 Such an understanding is in effect a
reservation because it changes the law for the United States. 131 As such, the United
States, like Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, to make discriminatory
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laws against women. Thus, the international rule against gender discrimination is
severely weakened.
III. CONCLUSION
¶46

In order to achieve its goals of removing doubts as to U.S. commitment to
international human rights and of influencing the world community, the U.S. must make
three changes: (1) the U.S. should withdraw its first reservation concerning the juvenile
death penalty; (2) it should withdraw its first understanding concerning discrimination;
and (3) the U.S. should modify its domestic laws in order to conform with the
international standard. The U.S. should also consider withdrawing those RUDs which
merely assert different labels or purport to exclude compliance during times of
emergency. However, the U.S. should not be afraid to keep those RUDs which are
distinctive rights, especially those which are also recognized under European law.

